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With few exceptions, economic analyses of "cap-and-trade" permit trading mechanisms for climate
change mitigation have been based on first-best scenarios without pre-existing distortions or regulations.
The reason is obvious: interactions between permit trading and other regulations will be complex.
However, climate policy proposed for the U.S. will certainly interact with existing laws, and will
also likely include additional regulatory changes with their own sets of interactions.  Major bills introduced
in the U.S. Congress have included both permit trading and traditional command and control regulations
– a combination sometimes called "belts and suspenders."  This paper discusses interactions between
these instruments, and begins to lay out a framework for thinking about them systematically.  The
most important determinant of how the two types of instruments interact involves whether or not the
cap-and-trade permit price would induce more or less abatement than mandated by the traditional standards
alone.  Moreover, economists' experience predicting the costs of environmental regulations suggests
we are more likely to overestimate the costs of cap-and-trade, and therefore the price of carbon permits,
than we are to overestimate the costs of a traditional regulatory standard, and that therefore the regulatory
standards will likely reduce the cost-effectiveness benefits of cap-and-trade.
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  Climate policy, if it is to be successful, will be large.  Aldy and Pizer (2008) put the cost to the 
U.S. as comparable to the "total cost of all existing environmental regulation."  Unfortunately, 
economists' models work best at the margins, predicting the consequences of small incremental changes 
in policy affecting isolated sectors of the economy.  Models work less well for large discrete shifts in 
policy affecting many sectors simultaneously, the type of regulation likely to be necessary to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  The difficulty inherent in assessing large policy changes is that their 
general equilibrium effects can be vast – even bigger than their direct effects. 
  Another word for general equilibrium effects, broadly speaking, is "interactions."  The size and 
scope of proposed climate legislation means there will be important interactions with most of the 
economy, including government tax revenues, other environmental problems aside from climate change, 
labor markets, terms of trade effects, and other government regulations.   
  To define a reasonably limited area of attention, I focus on the simplest and most direct form of 
interaction – those between the tradable GHG emissions permit systems ("cap and trade") that are part of 
many proposed and enacted new climate bills around the world, and the more traditional command-and-
control regulatory standards.  For climate regulations that have already been passed, mostly in Europe, 
and for the climate regulations that have been proposed in the U.S., the coexistence of these multiple 
instruments is "the norm, rather than the exception" (Bennear and Stavins, 2007).  In part, that 
coexistence has emerged because the cap-and-trade climate laws have been laid down on top of decades 
of traditional standards.  But the coexistence is also written into the language of climate bills that typically 
include both tradable permits and traditional standards.  Either way, we need to think about interactions 
between the two types of regulatory instruments.   
  The coupling of tradable permits with traditional standards has been called a "belt-and-
suspenders" approach (Pearlstein 2009).  In this case, however, it is not clear whether the belt and 2 
 
suspenders are mutually reinforcing, redundant but harmless, or working at cross-purposes.  All three 
viewpoints have appeared in print.  Krugman (2010) articulates the mutually reinforcing viewpoint: "I 
would advocate supplementing market-based disincentives with direct controls."  Sijm (2005) makes the 
case for redundancy: "the coexistence of [tradable permits] and policies affecting fossil fuel use by 
participating sectors is hard to justify and, hence, these policies could be considered to be redundant and 
ready to be abolished."  And the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2009) sees the two as sometimes 
conflicting: "regulatory standards combined with market-based approaches often will increase the cost of 
meeting an environmental goal." 
  Which viewpoint is correct?  The answer can be seen in a simple reinterpretation of the textbook 
partial-equilibrium model illustrating the cost-effectiveness of tradable permit schemes.  And that answer 
depends on whether the price of the tradable GHG emissions permits, and hence the marginal cost of 
compliance with the cap-and-trade legislation, is higher or lower than the marginal cost of compliance 
with the traditional regulatory standard.  Intuitively, if the permit price exceeds a firm's regulatory 
compliance costs, that firm would abate beyond the regulatory standard anyway, in response to the cap-
and-trade incentives, and the regulatory standard would be irrelevant for that firm.  By contrast, if the 
permit price falls below the regulatory compliance costs for a firm, the firm would meet the regulatory 
standard exactly and either sell excess permits or buy fewer than it would under cap-and-trade alone.  The 
regulatory standard raises the firm's cost of abating emissions without any resulting increase in overall 
abatement.  Are there economic reasons to pair a tradable permit system with traditional regulatory 
standards?  If there are other market failures aside from the GHG externality, or there are administrative 
complications in directly targeting GHG emissions, then there may be rationales for combining the two 
policies, though here we must be careful not to extrapolate from logic that applies to local pollutants but 
not to greenhouse gases.  And finally, economists' demonstrated experience forecasting regulatory costs 
suggest we are more likely to overstate the costs of meeting a cap-and-trade regulation than a traditional 
standard, and that therefore where the two instruments are paired, they are likely to increase costs without 
accompanying abatement benefits. 3 
 
  Before turning to focus on interactions between cap-and-trade and traditional standards, it is 
worth recognizing a few of the many important interactions the simple textbook model omits. 
 
Other Interactions -- An Aside 
  U.S. climate policy will interact with a long list of other important considerations.  For example, 
analysts have long recognized that policies aimed at reducing one pollutant may result in more or less 
emissions of another (Sigman, 1996).  For another, an enormous literature exists on spillover effects 
across countries, either because environmental regulations in one country move polluting industry to less 
stringent countries (Brunnermeier et al., 2004), or because, more subtly, environmental regulations have 
terms of trade effects (Bohringer et al., 2010).  Another vast literature looks interactions between 
pollution taxes and other government taxes (Goulder, 2002) and expenditures (Metcalf, 2008).   
  The focus here, broadly speaking, is about how environmental regulations targeted at the same 
pollutant interact with one another.  Economists have begun to recognize the importance of these 
interactions, as policies have begun to pile up and interact in complex ways (Oikonomou and Jepma, 
2008; Sorrel and Sijm, 2003; Either and Pethig, 2009).  This work tends to provide semantic taxonomies 
of interactions, elaborate charts of interactions, or models with features designed to study specific but 
very complex parts of the EU's existing tradable permit system.  And, to my knowledge, there has been no 
empirical work that would shed light on the extent of the possible interactions or their consequent effects. 
 
The Textbook Model 
  For a long time, economists have focused on persuading policymakers to use market-based 
instruments – emissions taxes or cap-and-trade – instead of traditional regulatory standards rather than in 
addition to traditional standards.  Some version of figure 1 appears in most undergraduate environmental 
economics texts, as a means of illustrating the cost-effectiveness of a tradable permit system compared 
with a regulatory standard.  The bottom axis displays the total uncontrolled pollution from two sources.  
The sources could be two factories, two industries, two different control strategies, etc.  Source one, for 4 
 
example, could be carbon mitigation from utilities using renewable energy portfolios, and source 2 could 
represent carbon mitigation from increased energy efficiency.  Each source has a marginal abatement cost 
curve (MAC).  Regulatory standards mandate a certain amount of abatement from each source.  Figure 1 
depicts two such standards, where the standard imposed on source 1 (Std1) leads to lower marginal 
abatement costs than the standard imposed on source 2 (Std2).  The point of tradable permits is to allow 
source 1 to do more abatement and source 2 to do less abatement, until the MACs are equal (to P*) and 
no further gains are possible.  The cost savings are areas c+d−b, or equivalently the shaded areas a+c.  
These cost savings provide the justification for replacing standards with tradable permits. 
  In practice, however, US climate legislation will likely contain a tradable permit scheme along 
with regulatory standards, either because the standards predate the newer tradable permit scheme, or 
because the new legislation has both parts.  For example, Title III of H.R. 2454, the bill the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed in 2009, would impose a tradable cap on GHG emissions, while Title I of the 
same bill requires electric utilities to generate up to 25 percent of their output from renewable sources. 
  First suppose that the standards on the two sources, "Std1" and "Std2" in figure 1, are designed to 
achieve the same total abatement as the permit system acting alone, where the permit-only policy would 
result in the permit price P*.  Initially, suppose that Std1 is in effect, that source 2 faces no standard, and 
that the permit policy is added on top of the single standard Std1 – a belt and suspenders approach.  In this 
case, the marginal cost to source 1 of meeting Std1 is P', which is less than the permit price P*.  For 
source 1, the regulatory standard is effectively irrelevant.  Polluters in this situation would choose to do 
more abatement than required by the standard, even if the standard did not exist.  There may be some 
regulatory costs associated with administering the standard (monitoring, compliance paperwork, etc.), but 
other than that, the standard has no economic costs. 
  On the other hand, suppose the single standard is like "Std2" in figure 1, combined with the same 
permit policy with price P*.  Here the marginal cost of meeting the standard exceeds the marginal costs of 
meeting the tradable emissions cap.  By forcing more abatement via source 2, Std2 standard lowers the 
market price of the tradable permits from P* to P', reducing the incentive for polluters to abate via source 5 
 
1 (down to the same level as if they had faced only Std1).  In this simple two-source model, the efficiency 
costs from combining standard 2 with a cap-and-trade permit policy – belts and suspenders – are the 
shaded areas, a+c, the same as the total efficiency cost of imposing both standards with no tradable 
permits.  The cost savings from the tradable permit scheme are eliminated by the imposition of standard 2 
alone.
1 
Setting aside for a moment the possibility that the standard and permit schemes are mutually 
reinforcing in some way not described by figure 1, how can we tell if the standard is irrelevant like 
standard 1, or costly like standard 2?  The key distinction is whether the marginal compliance costs for 
meeting the standard are lower or higher than the cap-and-trade permit price.  If the costs from the 
standard are lower, the standard is largely irrelevant; if the costs from the standard are higher, it imposes 
real costs. 
  The CBO (2009) estimates that the renewable portfolio standards in Title I of H.R.2454 are like 
standard 1 in figure 1 – largely irrelevant economically because the estimated cost of meeting the standard 
will fall short of the estimated tradable GHG emissions permit price.  By contrast, Abrell and Weight 
(2008) examine the European Union's Emissions Trading System, in conjunction with the renewable 
portfolio standards in Germany.  They find the German renewable portfolio standard to be much more 
costly than the price of GHG permits, and that the renewable standards push the carbon price to zero.   In 
other words, all of the abatement necessary will come from the one source – renewables, despite the fact 
that other sources are less costly.
2   
  This finding is typical.  Fullerton et al. (1997) find that forcing electric utilities to abate carbon 
with scrubbers, rather than by purchasing sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission permits, increases abatement 
costs by a multiple of five.  Gonzalez (2007) surveys a number of papers that examine this tradeoff 
                                                 
1 Fischer and Preonas (2010) formalize this line of reasoning where a tradable permit system interacts with policies 
promoting renewable sources of electricity. 
2 In fact, if Abrell and Weight are correct, the cost-inefficiency of Germany's renewable portfolio may have a silver 
lining.  The standards would lead to an excess supply of permits, meaning that they reduce GHG emissions by more 
than the total required by the carbon cap.  In other words, renewables alone as a source of abatement reduce GHG by 
more than would be reduced by all sources combined under the tradable cap.   6 
 
between tradable emissions permits and renewable electricity standards.  The studies he examines find 
that the coexistence of the two instruments is generally costly, because renewable electricity sources are 
not typically the least-cost means of abating GHG emissions.  For example, Unger and Ahlgren (2005) 
examine tradable GHG permits for the Nordic countries, and find that a renewable electricity standard of 
10 percent reduces carbon emissions at a cost seven times higher than a pure cap-and-trade system.   
  All of these studies make predictions about whether the non-market regulations will be 
inframarginal, inducing less compliance than predicted by response to cap and trade, or binding, inducing 
more compliance.  This turns out to be a tricky forecast, because the whole rationale for cap-and-trade is 
that compliance costs are difficult to predict.  In fact, Harrington, et al. (2000) compare ex ante and ex 
post assessments of U.S. regulations issued by EPA and OSHA, and find that the ex ante forecasts of 
costs are typically too high.   
"Of the rules initially examined, 14 projected inflated total costs, while pre-regulation 
estimates were too low for only 3 rules. These exaggerated adjustment costs are often 
attributable to underestimates of the potential that technological change could minimize 
pollution abatement costs."   
 
Moreover, the largest overestimates occurred in the case of the market-based policies – taxes and tradable 
permit schemes, which makes sense because those rules leave polluters the most scope for flexible 
technological responses.  This in turn means that we are more likely to overestimate the costs of a cap-
and-trade component of any new climate bill, and less likely to overestimate the costs of any preexisting 
or accompanying traditional regulatory standards, leaving those standards more likely to interact badly 
with the permit trading mechanism, reducing its cost effectiveness.  Even if we predict that the renewable 
portfolio standards will be inframarginal, as the CBO (2009) predicts for the renewable portfolio 
standards in Title I of HR 2434, experience suggests that prediction is likely to overstate the carbon 
permit prices relative to renewable portfolio standards, and therefore to understate the degree to which the 
cost-effectiveness of carbon trading is undermined.   
  In an important sense, the problem here is worse than the usual comparison between standards 
and tradable permits.  In the standard case, highlighted famously in a table in Tietenberg (1990) 7 
 
documenting the efficiency gains from moving to a market-based policy, there is a hidden benefit of 
traditional regulatory standards.  Under standards, some sources of pollution over-abate.  For example, 
Atkinson and Lewis's (1974) study of particulates in St. Louis found that a market-based system that 
equated marginal abatement costs would meet the ambient standards at only one-sixth the cost of existing 
regulatory standards.  But Oates et al, (1989) point out that one of the reasons the regulatory standard's 
costs are high is that they over-regulate some sources in order to meet the ambient pollution standard 
everywhere.  An ideally-designed market-based system would just meet the constraint at every locale, and 
hence yield more pollution in some places than would the non-market standard.  If we take into account 
the net benefits of the market-based standard (net of those excess abatement benefits), the difference 
between market-based and non-market regulations is smaller.  The key, however, to the Oates et al. result 
is the spatial heterogeneity of pollution.  By imposing the same regulatory standard on all locations, some 
areas inevitably exceed the local ambient standard.  A market-based solution that allows over-complying 
areas to sell emissions permits until they just meet the local ambient pollution standard would comply 
with the regulation at lower cost, but impose some new environmental costs on those permit-selling 
regions.  Oates et al. account for that loss of environmental quality when they tally up the net benefits of 
market based policies.   
  For greenhouse gases, however, there would be no such net adjustment, because there are no 
geographic differences, or "hot spots" in climate change.  If a regulatory standard induces over-abatement 
by once source, that depresses the permit price for all sources, reducing abatement by other sources so as 
to completely offset the over-abatement in the first place.  In the Oates et al. example, the regulatory 
standard reduces pollution in some locales, without a corresponding increase elsewhere, because all 
regions must meet the minimum ambient standard.  With greenhouse gases, permit trading allows reduced 
emissions in some locales or by some sources to be completely offset by increased emissions elsewhere.  




Rationales for Multiple Policies: Other Market Failures and Administrative Complexity  
  Figure 1 and the accompanying text describe two possible results of interacting tradable permit 
schemes and traditional regulatory standards: the standards could be irrelevant, or they could increase 
compliance costs with no associated benefits.  But there is a third possibility.  There could be an 
economically sound rationale for enacting a tradable permit regulation in combination with a traditional 
regulatory standard – the belt and suspenders combination could work better than either policy alone.  
These rationales fall into two broad categories: (1) other market failures, and (2) administrative 
complexity.  While these rationales have been used to justify combining permits and traditional 
regulations for local air pollutants, such as the criteria air pollutants that have been regulated by the Clean 
Air Act since the 1970s, not all of the rationales turn out to be applicable to greenhouse gases and global 
climate change. 
  Start with the first category: "other market failures."  The main market failure is, of course, the 
pollution externality.  GHG emitters do not take into account damages they may impose on others or on 
future generations.  That, however, is unlikely to be the only departure from perfectly competitive 
assumptions relating to GHG emissions.  One additional market failure involves research and 
development (R&D) in new GHG-abating technologies.  If one firm invests in R&D and invents a new 
abatement technology, or a new energy efficiency technology that by coincidence abates GHG emissions, 
some benefits from that invention spill over to other firms, because they either imitate the technology or 
build upon it with further R&D.  Consequently, firms will likely underinvest in R&D, relative to what 
would be optimal.  Jaffe et al. (2005) nicely summarize the interactions between these two market 
failures: "Pollution creates a negative externality, and so the invisible hand allows too much of it. 
Technology creates positive externalities, and so the invisible hand produces too little of it."   
  In theory, however, R&D market failures can work in the opposite direction, and lead to 
overinvestment relative to the optimum.  Competitive firms may duplicate each other's R&D efforts, 
resulting in wasteful investment by some firms.  Similarly, firms may invest in rent-seeking R&D aimed 
at slight innovations that would replacing existing technologies with new ones that are only marginally 9 
 
better, but would capture market rents.
3  On balance, empirical studies find that the industry-wide return 
to R&D is approximately two to four times as high as the returns to any one firm, suggesting 
underinvestment in R&D (Jones and Williams, 1998).   
  To correct this underinvestment in R&D, we might consider pairing a tradable permit scheme to 
address the first market failure with an R&D subsidy to address the second, where the R&D subsidy 
induces GHG abatements like one of the two regulatory standards in figure 1.  However, unless there is 
something else at work here, nothing about the R&D market failure is particular to the environment, and 
there is no reason a sensible R&D policy shouldn't be economy-wide, rather than targeted at GHG-
reducing technologies.   
  In fact, however, there are other factors at work that may justify targeting R&D subsidies at GHG 
technologies.  One such justification involves the seeming insensitivity of consumers and businesses to 
energy price signals.  Hausman (1979) showed that implausibly high discount rates would be needed to 
justify the choices consumers were making among room air conditioners with varying energy efficiency 
and prices.  This "energy paradox" has been documented many times since then, and has been explained 
in various ways.  Levinson and Niemann (2004) note that for apartment tenants, either the landlords pay 
for the utility bills and tenants therefore have no incentive to conserve energy on a daily basis, or tenants 
pay for the utility bills and landlords therefore have no incentive to invest in energy-efficient appliances 
or construction.  Any price signals from a tradable permit system would be weakened because either 
tenants or landlords do not face the true marginal cost of their energy decisions.  This might provide a 
justification for combining a tradable permit policy with an R&D subsidy targeted at energy efficiency.
 4  
But more likely, it justifies pairing tradable permits with energy efficiency standards and building codes 
                                                 
3 Jones and Williams (1998) name this spillover aspect of R&D the “standing on shoulders” effect, and the socially 
wasteful duplication the "stepping on toes" effect. 
4 Another explanation for the energy paradox comes from Hassett and Metcalf (1993), who point out that energy 
prices are uncertain, but that energy saving investments are irreversible, leading to rational unwillingness to invest.  
In that case there is no "other market failure," and no economic rationale for a second policy instrument. 10 
 
for appliances and construction.
5  Either way, some form of regulatory standard could complement a 
GHG emissions permit system.
6 
  The second broad rationale for pairing traditional regulatory standards with tradable permit 
schemes involves administrative complexity – difficulty attaching a market price to emissions.  One such 
source of complexity that has been used to justify pairing tradable permits with regulatory standards in 
analogous contexts, but which would not apply to GHG emissions, involves the spatial heterogeneity of 
damages.  Unlike GHGs, the damages from most pollutants vary depending on where they are emitted.  
This makes organizing and administering a tradable permit scheme difficult.  One could imagine, for 
example, a matrix of pollution transfer coefficients mapping pollution from each location of emission and 
to each location of deposition (McGartland and Oates, 1985).  To avoid this, designers of the U.S. SO2 
trading program intentionally simplified the system.  One ton of SO2 is treated the same whether it is 
emitted in the Midwest and falls on New England , or emitted on the Atlantic coast and drifts out to sea..  
This spatial heterogeneity means that locations with high abatement cost s risk becoming large net 
purchasers of SO2 emissions permits and emitters of SO2, and therefore having high ambient SO2 
concentrations.  Some states responded to this by enacting command-and-control regulations on top of the 
SO2 trading program, or by prohibiting trades.  Wisconsin prevented some local utilities from buying 
SO2 permits, and Illinois mandated scrubber installation (Johnstone, 2003).  These constraints, coupling 
tradable permit and traditional regulations, can be seen as a costly response to the complexity of 
regulating heterogeneous sources.  But they are not relevant to GHG emissions because their justification 
is based on eliminating hot spots of excess pollution, and for climate change no such heterogeneity of 
damages exists.   
  A second "complexity" justification involves uncertainty in predicted abatement costs.  Since 
Weitzman (1974), economists have recognized that uncertainty in marginal pollution abatement costs 
                                                 
5 Another might be product labeling, which has been shown to be effective in combination with energy price 
increases (Newell et al., 1998).   
6 Acemoglu et al. (2010) model this formally in an optimal growth model with endogenous technical change and an 
environmental externality.  They show that the optimal policy can involve both a (dynamic) pollution tax and an 
R&D subsidy directed at the polluting sector. 11 
 
means there is an important distinction between quantity regulations (cap-and-trade) and price regulations 
(pollution taxes).  Cap-and-trade leads to certainty about the quantity of pollution, but uncertainty about 
the costs imposed on polluters.  Pollution taxes yield certain costs, but uncertain pollution quantities.  
Roberts and Spence (1976) proposed pairing the two, so that a set amount of pollution permits are traded, 
but polluters can exceed their permitted quantities by paying a pollution tax.  The tax puts a known 
ceiling on the otherwise uncertain permit price.  One could also imagine a price floor where the 
government would agree to purchase all permits at some set price (Pizer, 2002).  This type of price 
"collar" is contained in both the CLEAR Act proposed in 2009 by Senators Cantwell and Collins and the 
American Power Act proposed in 2010 by Senators Kerry and Lieberman.   
  These price collars, however, are not the type of multiple instrument setup imagined in figure 1, 
in that both the tradable permits and the price collar are related market-based instruments.  Price collars 
are more accurately described as slightly more elaborate versions of tradable permit policies, a single 
instrument.  Moreover, in several cases where the tradable permit schemes have included price caps, those 
caps have never been reached and were therefore irrelevant – much as a low-cost standard would be.  The 
Danish CO2 trading mechanism had a price cap at 40 DKK/ton, which was never reached (Johnstone, 
2003).  Similarly, the US Acid Rain program set an initial SO2 permit price cap at $1500/ton.  Permit 
prices mostly traded between $100 and $300, and the price cap was scrapped.  In both cases, it seems the 
existence of the price cap may have appeased worries about extremely high costs and eased passage of the 
legislation politically, but imposed no economic consequences. 
  A source of administrative complexity possibly more relevant to climate change involves 
difficulty monitoring emissions directly, a precondition for administering a tradable permit system.  In 
developing countries where households collect and burn firewood for heat and cooking, administering a 
tradable permit system for the resulting GHG emissions seems improbable.  For the U.S., however, where 
regulated markets already exist for the fuels consumers use for home energy, administering an upstream 
tradable permit system seems relatively straightforward.   12 
 
  Another oft-cited example of monitoring difficulties involves automobile tailpipe emissions.  For 
criteria pollutants, such as nitrogen oxides (NOx) and carbon monoxide (CO), tailpipe emissions depend 
on the nature of the gasoline, the characteristics of the vehicle, and the behavior of the driver.  Regulating 
or permitting tailpipe emissions directly still seems technologically infeasible.  And regulating gasoline, 
vehicle characteristics, or miles driven in isolation would miss the other components.  (A gasoline tax 
provides no incentive to maintain emission control equipment.)  The obvious solution is a combination of 
policies, such as the gasoline tax and new car subsidy studied by Fullerton and West (2002, 2010) or 
Walls and Palmer (2001).  A key difference, however, between the criteria pollutants (NOx, CO, etc.) and 
greenhouse gases is that while criteria pollutant emissions depend on automobile and driver 
characteristics, GHG emissions depend almost exclusively on the carbon content of the fuel and how 
much is consumed.  So a tradable permit system can be administered quite easily, upstream at the level of 
the fuel suppliers.
7 
  Metcalf and Weisbach (2009) address this point directly.  They examine the entire inventory of 
U.S. GHG emissions, and show that 80 percent of those emissions could be covered by a tax or permit-
trading policy governing only about 3000 taxed or regulated entities.  The other 20 percent would have to 
be regulated with traditional standards.  So long as polluters in that remaining 20 percent were not 
allowed to sell permits to the other 80 percent based on their compliance with those standards, there 
would be no interaction between the two policy instruments.  Metcalf and Weisbach's analysis suggests 
that the administrative complexity argument used to justify combining tradable permits with traditional 
regulations for other air pollutants does not apply to GHG emissions in the United States. 
  In sum, these other market failures and sources of administrative complexity can in theory 
provide economic rationales for combining cap-and-trade with more traditional standards, but we must be 
careful.  In many cases the rationales do not apply to the case of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change, because GHG damages do not depend on the location of emissions, and because GHC 
emissions are more directly related to the characteristics of fuels and can be effectively administered 
                                                 
7 See Erin Mansur's chapter in this volume: "Upstream versus Downstream Implementation of Climate Policy". 13 
 
upstream of final users.  The most consistent economic rationale for multiple instruments involves either 
(a) multiple market failures, as with the R&D externality and the landlord/tenant energy paradox, or (b) 
administrative difficulty assigning permits to GHG emissions, as with nonpoint sources in developing 
countries.  In other cases the rationale is not so clear, and we should ask whether the multiple-policy 
legislation enacted in Europe and proposed for the U.S. has an economic basis.   
 
Conclusion 
  Climate policy in the U.S. is likely to combine tradable permits with more traditional regulatory 
standards.  These standards have the potential to be harmlessly redundant, to reduce the cost-effectiveness 
of the tradable permits, or to solve a problem involving multiple market failures or administrative 
complexity.  In the worst-case scenario, if polluters are allowed to sell permits based on their compliance 
with non-market regulations two things could happen.  (1) The non-market, traditional regulatory portion 
of a climate bill could reduce the efficiency gains from the market-based tradable permit portion.  And 
(2), the market-based, tradable permit parts of a climate bill could reduce the environmental gains from 
the traditional regulatory standards.  The root cause of both is the same:  polluters forced to meet a costly 
regulatory standard sell permits, reducing their price, and shrinking the market incentives for abatement 
from other sources. 
  To assess in advance whether the traditional regulatory components of new legislation are 
redundant or interact to reduce the cost effectiveness of the cap-and-trade components, we need to 
forecast the compliance costs of both components.  But as Harrington et al. (2000) show, we are likely to 
overstate the compliance costs of cap-and-trade, relative to traditional regulations, and therefore to 
understate the degree to which the traditional regulations erode the cost-effectiveness of cap-and-trade. 
  If the non-market component of legislation has an economic rationale – a second market failure, 
or difficulty regulating the externality directly – then in a best-case scenario, polluters would not be 
allowed to sell emissions permits based on compliance with the non-market parts of the law.  This is a 
legislative issue, but the economic rationale is that if polluters can meet their tradable caps by complying 14 
 
with the non-market regulation, that regulation is either irrelevant and a waste of administrative resources, 
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